AnomieBOT: Rescuing orphaned refs ("AcademyC2000" from rev 871172424)
'''[[China]] has intervened in foreign countries''' on numerous occasions. Traditionally, official stances by China included a non-intervention approach, though as it became an [[emerging power]], it has utilized intervention tactics.<ref name="PPFint">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref>
==Characteristics==
In order to "maintain order" both domestically and abroad, China enacts both policies of non-interventionism and interventionism.<ref name="PPFint"/> Being the world's second largest aid donor, China uses economic policies to intervene internationally, providing developmental aid to over 100 countries, especially to nations sanctioned by Western governments.<ref name="PPFint"/> Both the [[Export-Import Bank of China]] and the [[China Development Bank]] lend more in volume to developing nations than all [[G7]] nations combined and more than the [[World Bank]]. As China has grown, it has positioned itself to change international networks instead of remaining neutral<ref name="CQ2001">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> and to protect its interests abroad, especially in a post-Cold War era.<ref name=AP2014>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> Chinese scholars have increasingly advocated for interventionist policies to protect Chinese interests in a globalized international community.<ref name=AP2014/>
==History==
===Cold War===
====Korean War====
[[File:Battle of Triangle Hill Chinese Infantrymen.jpg|thumb|Chinese Infantrymen at the [[Battle of Triangle Hill]]|alt=|180x180px]]
[[File:China Crosses Yalu.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Chinese forces cross the Yalu River.]]
On 20 August 1950, Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] informed the UN that "Korea is China's neighbor ... The Chinese people cannot but be concerned about a solution of the Korean question". Thus, through neutral-country diplomats, China warned that in safeguarding Chinese [[national security]], they would intervene against the UN Command in Korea. President Truman interpreted the communication as "a bald attempt to blackmail the UN", and dismissed it.<ref name="Offner2002" />
On 1 October 1950, the day that UN troops crossed the 38th parallel, the Soviet ambassador forwarded a telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou requesting that China send five to six divisions into Korea, and Kim Il-sung sent frantic appeals to Mao for Chinese military intervention. At the same time, Stalin made it clear that Soviet forces themselves would not directly intervene.
[[File:1954 deng hua.jpg|thumb|left|Three commanders of PVA during the Korean War. From left to right: [[Chen Geng]] (1952), [[Peng Dehuai]] (1950–1952) and [[Deng Hua]] (1952–1953)]]
In a series of emergency meetings that lasted from 2 to 5 October, Chinese leaders debated whether to send Chinese troops into Korea. There was considerable resistance among many leaders, including senior military leaders, to confronting the U.S. in Korea. Mao strongly supported intervention, and Zhou was one of the few Chinese leaders who firmly supported him. After [[Lin Biao]] politely refused Mao's offer to command Chinese forces in Korea (citing his upcoming medical treatment), Mao decided that [[Peng Dehuai]] would be the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea after Peng agreed to support Mao's position. Mao then asked Peng to speak in favor of intervention to the rest of the Chinese leaders. After Peng made the case that if U.S. troops conquered Korea and reached the Yalu they might cross it and invade China the Politburo agreed to intervene in Korea. On 4 August 1950, with a planned invasion of Taiwan aborted due to the heavy U.S. naval presence, Mao reported to the Politburo that he would intervene in Korea when the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Taiwan invasion force was reorganized into the PLA North East Frontier Force.<ref name="AcademyC2000">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> On 8 October 1950, Mao redesignated the PLA North East Frontier Force as the Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]] (PVA).<ref name="Academy2000" />
To enlist Stalin's support, Zhou and a Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow on 10 October, at which point they flew to Stalin's home at the Black Sea. There they conferred with the top Soviet leadership, which included Joseph Stalin as well as [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], [[Lavrentiy Beria]] and [[Georgi Malenkov]]. Stalin initially agreed to send military equipment and ammunition, but warned Zhou that the Soviet Union's air force would need two or three months to prepare any operations. In a subsequent meeting, Stalin told Zhou that he would only provide China with equipment on a credit basis, and that the Soviet air force would only operate over Chinese airspace, and only after an undisclosed period of time. Stalin did not agree to send either military equipment or air support until March 1951. Mao did not find Soviet air support especially useful, as the fighting was going to take place on the south side of the Yalu. Soviet shipments of matériel, when they did arrive, were limited to small quantities of trucks, grenades, machine guns, and the like.
Immediately on his return to Beijing on 18 October 1950, Zhou met with Mao Zedong, [[Peng Dehuai]], and Gao Gang, and the group ordered two hundred thousand Chinese troops to enter North Korea, which they did on 25 October. UN aerial reconnaissance had difficulty sighting PVA units in daytime, because their march and [[bivouac shelter|bivouac]] discipline minimized aerial detection. The PVA marched "dark-to-dark" (19:00–03:00), and aerial camouflage (concealing soldiers, pack animals, and equipment) was deployed by 05:30. Meanwhile, daylight advance parties scouted for the next bivouac site. During daylight activity or marching, soldiers were to remain motionless if an aircraft appeared, until it flew away; PVA officers were under order to shoot security violators. Such battlefield discipline allowed a three-[[division (military)|division]] army to march the from [[Dandong|An-tung]], Manchuria, to the combat zone in some 19 days. Another division night-marched a circuitous mountain route, averaging daily for 18 days.
Meanwhile, on 15 October 1950, President Truman and General MacArthur met at [[Wake Island]] in the mid-Pacific Ocean. This meeting was much publicized because of the General's discourteous refusal to meet the President on the continental United States. To President Truman, MacArthur speculated there was little risk of Chinese intervention in Korea, and that the PRC's opportunity for aiding the KPA had lapsed. He believed the PRC had some 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria, and some 100,000–125,000 soldiers at the Yalu River. He further concluded that, although half of those forces might cross south, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter" without air force protection.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref name="Donovan1996" />
[[File:Warkorea American Soldiers.jpg|thumb|Soldiers from the U.S. [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]] in action near the Ch'ongch'on River, 20 November 1950]]
[[File:Chosin.jpg|thumb|A column of the [[1st Marine Division (United States)|US 1st Marine Division]] move through Chinese lines during their breakout from the Chosin Reservoir.]]
[[File:Map Eighth Army Retreat.jpg|thumb|Map of the UN retreat in the wake of Chinese intervention]]
After secretly crossing the Yalu River on 19 October, the PVA 13th Army Group launched the First Phase Offensive on 25 October, attacking the advancing UN forces near the Sino-Korean border. This military decision made solely by China changed the attitude of the Soviet Union. Twelve days after Chinese troops entered the war, Stalin allowed the Soviet Air Force to provide air cover, and supported more aid to China.<ref>Shen Zhihua, [https://ift.tt/2SdTViQ China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese-Soviet-Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War], The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 211–30</ref> After inflicting heavy losses on the ROK [[II Corps (South Korea)|II Corps]] at the [[Battle of Onjong]], the first confrontation between Chinese and U.S. military occurred on 1 November 1950. Deep in North Korea, thousands of soldiers from the PVA 39th Army [[encirclement|encircled]] and attacked the U.S. [[8th Cavalry Regiment (United States)|8th Cavalry Regiment]] with three-prong assaults—from the north, northwest, and west—and overran the defensive position flanks in the [[Battle of Unsan]].<ref name="Stewart" /> The surprise assault resulted in the UN forces retreating back to the [[Ch'ongch'on River]], while the Chinese unexpectedly disappeared into mountain hideouts following victory. It is unclear why the Chinese did not press the attack and follow up their victory.
The UN Command, however, were unconvinced that the Chinese had openly intervened because of the sudden Chinese withdrawal. On 24 November, the [[Home-by-Christmas Offensive]] was launched with the U.S. Eighth Army advancing in northwest Korea, while the US X Corps attacked along the Korean east coast. But the PVA were waiting in ambush with their [[Second Phase Offensive (Korean War)|Second Phase Offensive]], which they executed at two sectors: in the East at the Chosin Reservoir and in the Western sector at Ch'ongch'on River.
After consulting with Stalin, on 13 November, Mao appointed Zhou Enlai the overall commander and coordinator of the war effort, with Peng as field commander. On 25 November at the Korean western front, the PVA 13th Army Group attacked and overran the ROK II Corps at the [[Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River]], and then inflicted heavy losses on the US [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]] on the UN forces' right flank. The UN Command retreated; the U.S. Eighth Army's retreat (the longest in US Army history)<ref name="CohenGooch2006" /> was made possible because of the [[Turkish Brigade]]'s successful, but very costly, rear-guard [[Battle of Wawon|delaying action near Kunuri]] that slowed the PVA attack for two days (27–29 November). By 30 November, the PVA 13th Army Group managed to expel the U.S. Eighth Army from northwest Korea. Retreating from the north faster than they had counter-invaded, the Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel border in mid December. UN morale hit rock bottom when Lieutenant General [[Walton Walker]], commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, was killed on 23 December 1950 in an automobile accident.
Concurrent with the [[Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River]] was the [[Battle of Chosin Reservoir]], which the PVA 9th Army Group initiated on 27 November. Here the UNC forces fared comparatively better: like the Eighth Army the surprise attack also forced X Corps to retreat from northeast Korea, but they were in the process able to breakout from the attempted encirclement by the PVA and execute a [[Battle of Chosin Reservoir#Aftermath#Outcome assessment|successful tactical withdrawal]]. X Corps managed to establish a defensive perimeter at the port city of [[Hungnam]] on 11 December and were able to evacuate by 24 December in order to reinforce the badly depleted U.S. Eighth Army to the south. During the Hungnam evacuation, about 193 shiploads of UN Command forces and matériel (approximately 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies) were evacuated to Pusan. The [[SS Meredith Victory|SS ''Meredith Victory'']] was noted for evacuating 14,000 refugees, the largest rescue operation by a single ship, even though it was designed to hold 12 passengers. Before escaping, the UN Command forces [[scorched earth|razed]] most of Hungnam city, especially the port facilities.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref name="DoyleMayer1979" /> On 16 December 1950, President Truman declared a [[State of emergency#United States|national state of emergency]] with Presidential Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1953),<ref name="Espinoza2001" /> which remained in force until 14 September 1978. The next day, 17 December 1950, Kim Il-sung was deprived of the right of command of KPA by China.<ref>Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, MAO: The Unknown Story.</ref>
China justified its entry into the war as a response to "American aggression in the guise of the UN".<ref name="AcademyC2000" /> Later, the Chinese claimed that U.S. bombers had violated PRC national airspace on three separate occasions and attacked Chinese targets before China intervened.<ref name="Weng1966" /><ref name="AcademyB2000" />
====Vietnam War====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-48579-0009, Stralsund, Ho Chi Minh mit Matrosen der NVA.jpg|thumb|Ho Chi Minh from the [[Viet Minh|Việt Minh]] [[independence movement]] and [[Viet Cong|Việt Cộng]] with [[East Germany|East German]] sailors in [[Stralsund]] harbour, 1957]]
In 1950, China extended [[diplomatic recognition]] to the [[Viet Minh]]'s [[North Vietnam|Democratic Republic of Vietnam]] and sent heavy weapons, as well as military advisers led by [[Politics of Shanxi#List of Governors of Shanxi|Luo Guibo]] to assist the Viet Minh in its [[First Indochina War|war with the French]] (1946-1954). The first draft of the 1954 [[Geneva Conference (1954)|Geneva Accords]] was negotiated by French prime minister [[Pierre Mendès France]] and Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] who, seeing U.S. intervention coming, urged the Viet Minh to accept a partition at the [[17th parallel north|17th parallel]].<ref>Qiang Zhai, ''China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975'', University of North Carolina Press, pp. 54–55.</ref>
China's support for North Vietnam when the U.S. started to intervene included both financial aid and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of military personnel in support roles. In the summer of 1962, [[Mao Zedong]] agreed to supply Hanoi with 90,000 rifles and guns free of charge. Starting in 1965, China sent [[Anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft]] units and engineering [[battalion]]s to North Vietnam to repair the damage caused by American bombing, man anti-aircraft batteries, rebuild roads and railroads, transport supplies, and perform other engineering works. This freed North Vietnamese army units for combat in the South. China sent 320,000 troops and annual arms shipments worth $180 million.<ref>Qiang Zhai (2000), ''China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975'', University of North Carolina Press, p. 135</ref> The Chinese military claims to have caused 38% of American air losses in the war.<ref name="books.google.com.vn" /> China claimed that its military and economic aid to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong totaled $20 billion (approx. $143 billion adjusted for inflation in 2015) during the Vietnam War.<ref name="books.google.com.vn" /> Included in that aid were donations of 5 million tons of food to North Vietnam (equivalent to NV food production in a single year), accounting for 10–15% of the North Vietnamese food supply by the 1970s.<ref name="books.google.com.vn" />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: right"
|+Military aid given to North Vietnam by China<ref>Chen Jian, [https://ift.tt/2E4I4Rl "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War: 1964 to 1969"], Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 379. Citing "Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun" by Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, p. 416</ref>
|-
!Year
!Guns
!Artillery<br />pieces
!Bullets
!Artillery<br />shells
!Radio<br />trans-<br />mitters
!Telephones
!Tanks
!Planes
!Auto-<br />mobiles
|-
!1964
|| 80,500 || 1,205 || 25,240,000 || 335,000 || 426 || 2,941 || 16 || 18 || 25
|-
!1965
|| 220,767 || 4,439 || 114,010,000 || 1,800,000 || 2,779 || 9,502 || ? || 2 || 114
|-
!1966
|| 141,531 || 3,362 || 178,120,000 || 1,066,000 || 1,568 || 2,235 || ? || ? || 96
|-
!1967
|| 146,600 || 3,984 || 147,000,000 || 1,363,000 || 2,464 || 2,289 || 26 || 70 || 435
|-
!1968
|| 219,899 || 7,087 || 247,920,000 || 2,082,000 || 1,854 || 3,313 || 18 || ? || 454
|-
!1969
|| 139,900 || 3,906 || 119,117,000 || 1,357,000 || 2,210 || 3,453 || ? || ? || 162
|-
!1970
|| 101,800 || 2,212 || 29,010,000 || 397,000 || 950 || 1,600 || ? || ? || ?
|-
!1971
|| 143,100 || 7,898 || 57,190,000 || 1,899,000 || 2,464 || 4,424 || 80 || 4 || 4,011
|-
!1972
|| 189,000 || 9,238 || 40,000,000 || 2,210,000 || 4,370 || 5,905 || 220 || 14 || 8,758
|-
!1973
|| 233,500 || 9,912 || 40,000,000 || 2,210,000 || 4,335 || 6,447 || 120 || 36 || 1,210
|-
!1974
|| 164,500 || 6,406 || 30,000,000 || 1,390,000 || 5,148 || 4,663 || 80 || ? || 506
|-
!1975
|| 141,800 || 4,880 || 20,600,000 || 965,000 || 2,240 || 2,150 || ? || 20 || ?
|-
!Total
||'''1,922,897'''||'''64,529'''||'''1,048,207,000'''||'''17,074,000'''||'''30,808'''||'''48,922'''||'''560'''||'''164'''||'''15,771'''
|}
[[Sino-Soviet relations]] soured after the [[Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia|Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia]] in August 1968. In October, the Chinese demanded North Vietnam cut relations with Moscow, but Hanoi refused.<ref>Ang, Cheng Guan, ''Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective'', p. 27.</ref> The Chinese began to withdraw in November 1968 in preparation for a clash with the Soviets, which occurred at [[Zhenbao Island]] in March 1969.
The Chinese also began financing the [[Khmer Rouge]] as a counterweight to the Vietnamese communists at this time. China "armed and trained" the Khmer Rouge during the civil war and continued to aid them for years afterward.<ref>Bezlova, Antoaneta, [https://ift.tt/2ShrwbS China haunted by Khmer Rouge links], ''Asia Times'', 21 February 2009.</ref> The Khmer Rouge launched ferocious raids into Vietnam in 1975–1978. When Vietnam responded with an invasion that toppled the Khmer Rouge, China launched a brief, punitive [[Sino-Vietnamese War|invasion of Vietnam in 1979]].
===Post-Cold War===
In Latin America, developing countries became dependent on growing China during the [[2000s commodities boom]], relying on funds from exports to China and lending eventually led to trade deficits and debt among many Latin American nations who are no indebted to China.<ref name=":0">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> China has remained close to the governments of [[Bolivia]], [[Cuba]] and [[Venezuela]].<ref name=":0" />
[[File:The_Anti-Protest_Gear_Used_in_Venezuela_NYT_Investigates.webm|right|thumb|An investigation by ''[[The New York Times]]'' showing Norinco's riot-control equipment]]
Chinese [[State-owned company|state-owned]] [[Norinco]] often produces military and riot equipment for oppressive and [[rogue state]]<nowiki/>s, with ''[[The New York Times]]'' saying that the equipment and systems are "reflective of the hardball tactics that China takes against dissent".<ref name="NYTnorinco"> NYT Investigates|last=|first=|date=23 December 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|accessdate=5 August 2018}}</ref> This was especially apparent during the [[crisis in Venezuela]] when China supplied riot equipment to Venezuelan authorities combatting the [[Venezuelan protests (2014–present)|protests in Venezuela]].<ref name="NYTnorinco"/> According to the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]], China has also financially assisted Venezuela through its economic crisis so it could domestically benefit from cheap Venezuelan products.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref>
China has been the most important trade partner for North Korea and has helped maintain its stability in order to avoid its own domestic threats.<ref name=CFR18>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> When North Korea performs actions that China does not agree with, such as [[North Korean nuclear program|performing tests with its nuclear program]], China retaliates and witholds resources from the nation.<ref name=CFR18/>
==References==
[[Category:Foreign intervention]]
[[Category:Military history of China]]
[[Category:Foreign relations of China]]
==Characteristics==
In order to "maintain order" both domestically and abroad, China enacts both policies of non-interventionism and interventionism.<ref name="PPFint"/> Being the world's second largest aid donor, China uses economic policies to intervene internationally, providing developmental aid to over 100 countries, especially to nations sanctioned by Western governments.<ref name="PPFint"/> Both the [[Export-Import Bank of China]] and the [[China Development Bank]] lend more in volume to developing nations than all [[G7]] nations combined and more than the [[World Bank]]. As China has grown, it has positioned itself to change international networks instead of remaining neutral<ref name="CQ2001">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> and to protect its interests abroad, especially in a post-Cold War era.<ref name=AP2014>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> Chinese scholars have increasingly advocated for interventionist policies to protect Chinese interests in a globalized international community.<ref name=AP2014/>
==History==
===Cold War===
====Korean War====
[[File:Battle of Triangle Hill Chinese Infantrymen.jpg|thumb|Chinese Infantrymen at the [[Battle of Triangle Hill]]|alt=|180x180px]]
[[File:China Crosses Yalu.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Chinese forces cross the Yalu River.]]
On 20 August 1950, Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] informed the UN that "Korea is China's neighbor ... The Chinese people cannot but be concerned about a solution of the Korean question". Thus, through neutral-country diplomats, China warned that in safeguarding Chinese [[national security]], they would intervene against the UN Command in Korea. President Truman interpreted the communication as "a bald attempt to blackmail the UN", and dismissed it.<ref name="Offner2002" />
On 1 October 1950, the day that UN troops crossed the 38th parallel, the Soviet ambassador forwarded a telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou requesting that China send five to six divisions into Korea, and Kim Il-sung sent frantic appeals to Mao for Chinese military intervention. At the same time, Stalin made it clear that Soviet forces themselves would not directly intervene.
[[File:1954 deng hua.jpg|thumb|left|Three commanders of PVA during the Korean War. From left to right: [[Chen Geng]] (1952), [[Peng Dehuai]] (1950–1952) and [[Deng Hua]] (1952–1953)]]
In a series of emergency meetings that lasted from 2 to 5 October, Chinese leaders debated whether to send Chinese troops into Korea. There was considerable resistance among many leaders, including senior military leaders, to confronting the U.S. in Korea. Mao strongly supported intervention, and Zhou was one of the few Chinese leaders who firmly supported him. After [[Lin Biao]] politely refused Mao's offer to command Chinese forces in Korea (citing his upcoming medical treatment), Mao decided that [[Peng Dehuai]] would be the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea after Peng agreed to support Mao's position. Mao then asked Peng to speak in favor of intervention to the rest of the Chinese leaders. After Peng made the case that if U.S. troops conquered Korea and reached the Yalu they might cross it and invade China the Politburo agreed to intervene in Korea. On 4 August 1950, with a planned invasion of Taiwan aborted due to the heavy U.S. naval presence, Mao reported to the Politburo that he would intervene in Korea when the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Taiwan invasion force was reorganized into the PLA North East Frontier Force.<ref name="AcademyC2000">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> On 8 October 1950, Mao redesignated the PLA North East Frontier Force as the Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]] (PVA).<ref name="Academy2000" />
To enlist Stalin's support, Zhou and a Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow on 10 October, at which point they flew to Stalin's home at the Black Sea. There they conferred with the top Soviet leadership, which included Joseph Stalin as well as [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], [[Lavrentiy Beria]] and [[Georgi Malenkov]]. Stalin initially agreed to send military equipment and ammunition, but warned Zhou that the Soviet Union's air force would need two or three months to prepare any operations. In a subsequent meeting, Stalin told Zhou that he would only provide China with equipment on a credit basis, and that the Soviet air force would only operate over Chinese airspace, and only after an undisclosed period of time. Stalin did not agree to send either military equipment or air support until March 1951. Mao did not find Soviet air support especially useful, as the fighting was going to take place on the south side of the Yalu. Soviet shipments of matériel, when they did arrive, were limited to small quantities of trucks, grenades, machine guns, and the like.
Immediately on his return to Beijing on 18 October 1950, Zhou met with Mao Zedong, [[Peng Dehuai]], and Gao Gang, and the group ordered two hundred thousand Chinese troops to enter North Korea, which they did on 25 October. UN aerial reconnaissance had difficulty sighting PVA units in daytime, because their march and [[bivouac shelter|bivouac]] discipline minimized aerial detection. The PVA marched "dark-to-dark" (19:00–03:00), and aerial camouflage (concealing soldiers, pack animals, and equipment) was deployed by 05:30. Meanwhile, daylight advance parties scouted for the next bivouac site. During daylight activity or marching, soldiers were to remain motionless if an aircraft appeared, until it flew away; PVA officers were under order to shoot security violators. Such battlefield discipline allowed a three-[[division (military)|division]] army to march the from [[Dandong|An-tung]], Manchuria, to the combat zone in some 19 days. Another division night-marched a circuitous mountain route, averaging daily for 18 days.
Meanwhile, on 15 October 1950, President Truman and General MacArthur met at [[Wake Island]] in the mid-Pacific Ocean. This meeting was much publicized because of the General's discourteous refusal to meet the President on the continental United States. To President Truman, MacArthur speculated there was little risk of Chinese intervention in Korea, and that the PRC's opportunity for aiding the KPA had lapsed. He believed the PRC had some 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria, and some 100,000–125,000 soldiers at the Yalu River. He further concluded that, although half of those forces might cross south, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter" without air force protection.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref name="Donovan1996" />
[[File:Warkorea American Soldiers.jpg|thumb|Soldiers from the U.S. [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]] in action near the Ch'ongch'on River, 20 November 1950]]
[[File:Chosin.jpg|thumb|A column of the [[1st Marine Division (United States)|US 1st Marine Division]] move through Chinese lines during their breakout from the Chosin Reservoir.]]
[[File:Map Eighth Army Retreat.jpg|thumb|Map of the UN retreat in the wake of Chinese intervention]]
After secretly crossing the Yalu River on 19 October, the PVA 13th Army Group launched the First Phase Offensive on 25 October, attacking the advancing UN forces near the Sino-Korean border. This military decision made solely by China changed the attitude of the Soviet Union. Twelve days after Chinese troops entered the war, Stalin allowed the Soviet Air Force to provide air cover, and supported more aid to China.<ref>Shen Zhihua, [https://ift.tt/2SdTViQ China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese-Soviet-Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War], The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 211–30</ref> After inflicting heavy losses on the ROK [[II Corps (South Korea)|II Corps]] at the [[Battle of Onjong]], the first confrontation between Chinese and U.S. military occurred on 1 November 1950. Deep in North Korea, thousands of soldiers from the PVA 39th Army [[encirclement|encircled]] and attacked the U.S. [[8th Cavalry Regiment (United States)|8th Cavalry Regiment]] with three-prong assaults—from the north, northwest, and west—and overran the defensive position flanks in the [[Battle of Unsan]].<ref name="Stewart" /> The surprise assault resulted in the UN forces retreating back to the [[Ch'ongch'on River]], while the Chinese unexpectedly disappeared into mountain hideouts following victory. It is unclear why the Chinese did not press the attack and follow up their victory.
The UN Command, however, were unconvinced that the Chinese had openly intervened because of the sudden Chinese withdrawal. On 24 November, the [[Home-by-Christmas Offensive]] was launched with the U.S. Eighth Army advancing in northwest Korea, while the US X Corps attacked along the Korean east coast. But the PVA were waiting in ambush with their [[Second Phase Offensive (Korean War)|Second Phase Offensive]], which they executed at two sectors: in the East at the Chosin Reservoir and in the Western sector at Ch'ongch'on River.
After consulting with Stalin, on 13 November, Mao appointed Zhou Enlai the overall commander and coordinator of the war effort, with Peng as field commander. On 25 November at the Korean western front, the PVA 13th Army Group attacked and overran the ROK II Corps at the [[Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River]], and then inflicted heavy losses on the US [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]] on the UN forces' right flank. The UN Command retreated; the U.S. Eighth Army's retreat (the longest in US Army history)<ref name="CohenGooch2006" /> was made possible because of the [[Turkish Brigade]]'s successful, but very costly, rear-guard [[Battle of Wawon|delaying action near Kunuri]] that slowed the PVA attack for two days (27–29 November). By 30 November, the PVA 13th Army Group managed to expel the U.S. Eighth Army from northwest Korea. Retreating from the north faster than they had counter-invaded, the Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel border in mid December. UN morale hit rock bottom when Lieutenant General [[Walton Walker]], commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, was killed on 23 December 1950 in an automobile accident.
Concurrent with the [[Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River]] was the [[Battle of Chosin Reservoir]], which the PVA 9th Army Group initiated on 27 November. Here the UNC forces fared comparatively better: like the Eighth Army the surprise attack also forced X Corps to retreat from northeast Korea, but they were in the process able to breakout from the attempted encirclement by the PVA and execute a [[Battle of Chosin Reservoir#Aftermath#Outcome assessment|successful tactical withdrawal]]. X Corps managed to establish a defensive perimeter at the port city of [[Hungnam]] on 11 December and were able to evacuate by 24 December in order to reinforce the badly depleted U.S. Eighth Army to the south. During the Hungnam evacuation, about 193 shiploads of UN Command forces and matériel (approximately 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies) were evacuated to Pusan. The [[SS Meredith Victory|SS ''Meredith Victory'']] was noted for evacuating 14,000 refugees, the largest rescue operation by a single ship, even though it was designed to hold 12 passengers. Before escaping, the UN Command forces [[scorched earth|razed]] most of Hungnam city, especially the port facilities.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref name="DoyleMayer1979" /> On 16 December 1950, President Truman declared a [[State of emergency#United States|national state of emergency]] with Presidential Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1953),<ref name="Espinoza2001" /> which remained in force until 14 September 1978. The next day, 17 December 1950, Kim Il-sung was deprived of the right of command of KPA by China.<ref>Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, MAO: The Unknown Story.</ref>
China justified its entry into the war as a response to "American aggression in the guise of the UN".<ref name="AcademyC2000" /> Later, the Chinese claimed that U.S. bombers had violated PRC national airspace on three separate occasions and attacked Chinese targets before China intervened.<ref name="Weng1966" /><ref name="AcademyB2000" />
====Vietnam War====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-48579-0009, Stralsund, Ho Chi Minh mit Matrosen der NVA.jpg|thumb|Ho Chi Minh from the [[Viet Minh|Việt Minh]] [[independence movement]] and [[Viet Cong|Việt Cộng]] with [[East Germany|East German]] sailors in [[Stralsund]] harbour, 1957]]
In 1950, China extended [[diplomatic recognition]] to the [[Viet Minh]]'s [[North Vietnam|Democratic Republic of Vietnam]] and sent heavy weapons, as well as military advisers led by [[Politics of Shanxi#List of Governors of Shanxi|Luo Guibo]] to assist the Viet Minh in its [[First Indochina War|war with the French]] (1946-1954). The first draft of the 1954 [[Geneva Conference (1954)|Geneva Accords]] was negotiated by French prime minister [[Pierre Mendès France]] and Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] who, seeing U.S. intervention coming, urged the Viet Minh to accept a partition at the [[17th parallel north|17th parallel]].<ref>Qiang Zhai, ''China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975'', University of North Carolina Press, pp. 54–55.</ref>
China's support for North Vietnam when the U.S. started to intervene included both financial aid and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of military personnel in support roles. In the summer of 1962, [[Mao Zedong]] agreed to supply Hanoi with 90,000 rifles and guns free of charge. Starting in 1965, China sent [[Anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft]] units and engineering [[battalion]]s to North Vietnam to repair the damage caused by American bombing, man anti-aircraft batteries, rebuild roads and railroads, transport supplies, and perform other engineering works. This freed North Vietnamese army units for combat in the South. China sent 320,000 troops and annual arms shipments worth $180 million.<ref>Qiang Zhai (2000), ''China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975'', University of North Carolina Press, p. 135</ref> The Chinese military claims to have caused 38% of American air losses in the war.<ref name="books.google.com.vn" /> China claimed that its military and economic aid to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong totaled $20 billion (approx. $143 billion adjusted for inflation in 2015) during the Vietnam War.<ref name="books.google.com.vn" /> Included in that aid were donations of 5 million tons of food to North Vietnam (equivalent to NV food production in a single year), accounting for 10–15% of the North Vietnamese food supply by the 1970s.<ref name="books.google.com.vn" />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: right"
|+Military aid given to North Vietnam by China<ref>Chen Jian, [https://ift.tt/2E4I4Rl "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War: 1964 to 1969"], Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 379. Citing "Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun" by Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, p. 416</ref>
|-
!Year
!Guns
!Artillery<br />pieces
!Bullets
!Artillery<br />shells
!Radio<br />trans-<br />mitters
!Telephones
!Tanks
!Planes
!Auto-<br />mobiles
|-
!1964
|| 80,500 || 1,205 || 25,240,000 || 335,000 || 426 || 2,941 || 16 || 18 || 25
|-
!1965
|| 220,767 || 4,439 || 114,010,000 || 1,800,000 || 2,779 || 9,502 || ? || 2 || 114
|-
!1966
|| 141,531 || 3,362 || 178,120,000 || 1,066,000 || 1,568 || 2,235 || ? || ? || 96
|-
!1967
|| 146,600 || 3,984 || 147,000,000 || 1,363,000 || 2,464 || 2,289 || 26 || 70 || 435
|-
!1968
|| 219,899 || 7,087 || 247,920,000 || 2,082,000 || 1,854 || 3,313 || 18 || ? || 454
|-
!1969
|| 139,900 || 3,906 || 119,117,000 || 1,357,000 || 2,210 || 3,453 || ? || ? || 162
|-
!1970
|| 101,800 || 2,212 || 29,010,000 || 397,000 || 950 || 1,600 || ? || ? || ?
|-
!1971
|| 143,100 || 7,898 || 57,190,000 || 1,899,000 || 2,464 || 4,424 || 80 || 4 || 4,011
|-
!1972
|| 189,000 || 9,238 || 40,000,000 || 2,210,000 || 4,370 || 5,905 || 220 || 14 || 8,758
|-
!1973
|| 233,500 || 9,912 || 40,000,000 || 2,210,000 || 4,335 || 6,447 || 120 || 36 || 1,210
|-
!1974
|| 164,500 || 6,406 || 30,000,000 || 1,390,000 || 5,148 || 4,663 || 80 || ? || 506
|-
!1975
|| 141,800 || 4,880 || 20,600,000 || 965,000 || 2,240 || 2,150 || ? || 20 || ?
|-
!Total
||'''1,922,897'''||'''64,529'''||'''1,048,207,000'''||'''17,074,000'''||'''30,808'''||'''48,922'''||'''560'''||'''164'''||'''15,771'''
|}
[[Sino-Soviet relations]] soured after the [[Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia|Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia]] in August 1968. In October, the Chinese demanded North Vietnam cut relations with Moscow, but Hanoi refused.<ref>Ang, Cheng Guan, ''Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective'', p. 27.</ref> The Chinese began to withdraw in November 1968 in preparation for a clash with the Soviets, which occurred at [[Zhenbao Island]] in March 1969.
The Chinese also began financing the [[Khmer Rouge]] as a counterweight to the Vietnamese communists at this time. China "armed and trained" the Khmer Rouge during the civil war and continued to aid them for years afterward.<ref>Bezlova, Antoaneta, [https://ift.tt/2ShrwbS China haunted by Khmer Rouge links], ''Asia Times'', 21 February 2009.</ref> The Khmer Rouge launched ferocious raids into Vietnam in 1975–1978. When Vietnam responded with an invasion that toppled the Khmer Rouge, China launched a brief, punitive [[Sino-Vietnamese War|invasion of Vietnam in 1979]].
===Post-Cold War===
In Latin America, developing countries became dependent on growing China during the [[2000s commodities boom]], relying on funds from exports to China and lending eventually led to trade deficits and debt among many Latin American nations who are no indebted to China.<ref name=":0">Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> China has remained close to the governments of [[Bolivia]], [[Cuba]] and [[Venezuela]].<ref name=":0" />
[[File:The_Anti-Protest_Gear_Used_in_Venezuela_NYT_Investigates.webm|right|thumb|An investigation by ''[[The New York Times]]'' showing Norinco's riot-control equipment]]
Chinese [[State-owned company|state-owned]] [[Norinco]] often produces military and riot equipment for oppressive and [[rogue state]]<nowiki/>s, with ''[[The New York Times]]'' saying that the equipment and systems are "reflective of the hardball tactics that China takes against dissent".<ref name="NYTnorinco"> NYT Investigates|last=|first=|date=23 December 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|accessdate=5 August 2018}}</ref> This was especially apparent during the [[crisis in Venezuela]] when China supplied riot equipment to Venezuelan authorities combatting the [[Venezuelan protests (2014–present)|protests in Venezuela]].<ref name="NYTnorinco"/> According to the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]], China has also financially assisted Venezuela through its economic crisis so it could domestically benefit from cheap Venezuelan products.<ref>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref>
China has been the most important trade partner for North Korea and has helped maintain its stability in order to avoid its own domestic threats.<ref name=CFR18>Liquid error: wrong number of arguments (1 for 2)</ref> When North Korea performs actions that China does not agree with, such as [[North Korean nuclear program|performing tests with its nuclear program]], China retaliates and witholds resources from the nation.<ref name=CFR18/>
==References==
[[Category:Foreign intervention]]
[[Category:Military history of China]]
[[Category:Foreign relations of China]]
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